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I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Nature Of The Case 
This appeal concerns the Respondent, Tiller White, LLC's (hereinafter "Tiller White") 
constructive notice of an unrecorded easement involving property it acquired and, at a minimum, 
its failure to conduct a reasonable and prudent investigation to ascertain the status of an easement 
possessed by a third party, Appellant, Canyon Outdoor Media, LLC (hereinafter "Canyon 
Outdoor") who owns an advertising billboard sign standing 40 feet in height and 30 feet in width 
affixed to the property before the acquisition of the property by Tiller White, in spite of having 
actual and constructive knowledge of the following undisputed facts: 
1) Tiller White had actual knowledge that the advertising billboard sign had been 
situated on the property for nearly three (3) years before the acquisition of the property; 
2) The advertising billboard sign was not owned by the Sellers; 
3) Tiller White was provided and thoroughly read and reviewed the terms of a lease 
pertaining to the billboard sign before and after its offer was made and accepted by Sellers; 
4) Tiller White had actual knowledge that the Sellers received a lump sum payment 
and it would not be receiving any rental income associated with the advertising billboard sign 
after acquisition of the property; 
5) The only provision in the lease which provided for a lump sum payment 
specifically expressed that a lump sum payment would be made for the acquisition of a 
permanent easement on the property; and 
6) Tiller White made no attempt to contact or communicate with Canyon Outdoor to 
determine its interest in the property. 
The Court erred in ruling that Canyon Outdoor's failure to record the easement 
conclusively rendered Canyon Outdoor's easement invalid and unenforceable. Further, the 
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easement and White's 
failure to further investigate in good faith the true interest and claim of Canyon Outdoor. 
B. Procedural History 
On February 12, 2014, Tiller White filed its Complaint against Canyon Outdoor alleging 
that that Canyon Outdoor's lease expired and that it was a bona fide purchaser of the property 
and therefore requesting the billboard sign be removed. The case was assigned to the magistrate 
court. See, R., pp. 5-7. 
On June 6, 2014, Canyon Outdoor filed its special appearance and motion to dismiss 
complaint on grounds of lack of proper service and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, R., p. 
2. 
11. 
On July 10, 2014, the magistrate court transferred the case to the district court. See id 
On August 7, 2014, Canyon Outdoor filed its Answer to the Complaint. See, R., pp. 8-
On April 10, 2015, Tiller White and Canyon Outdoor stipulated to present the case by 
Motion for Summary Judgment. See, R., p. 3. 
On April 16, 2015, the Court entered its Order granting the parties stipulation to present 
case by motion for summary judgment. See id. 
On April 10, 2015, Canyon Outdoor filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, along with 
its supporting memorandum and affidavits. See, R., pp. 12-98. 
On April 29, 2015, Tiller White filed its Response to Canyon Outdoor's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, along with its supporting memorandum and affidavit. See, R., pp. 99-117. 
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May 7, 5, Canyon Outdoor filed memorandum response to White's 
118-1 
On May l 5, parties presented argument on 
Judgment before the district court. See, R., p. 3. 
On June 2015, the District Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order. See, 
R., pp. 128-136. 
On June 22, 2015, Judgment was entered consistent with the Court's Memorandum 
Decision and Order. See, R., pp. 137-138. 
On July 31, 2015, Canyon Outdoor filed its Notice of Appeal. See, R., pp. 139-142. 
C Statement o(Facts 
Glenn and Rachel Knapp (hereinafter the "Knapps") were the previous owners of the real 
property located at 901 12th Avenue South, Nampa, Idaho 83651, and more particularly 
described as: 
Lot 5 in Block 36 of WATERHOUSE ADDITION TO NAMPA, Canyon County, 
Idaho, according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book 1 of Plats at Page 15, 
records of said County. 
See, R., pp. 54 and 68. 1 
The Knapps were approached by a representative of Lockridge Outdoor Advertising 
Agency who offered to lease a portion of their land to construct, operate and maintain an 
advertising billboard sign. See id., pp. 54-55 and 68-69. The parties negotiated some of the 
terms for the lease and agreed upon a number of terms, including but not limited to A) an annual 
rental payment of $1,500 or 15% of the structure's revenue, whichever was greater; B) a ten (10) 
year term with an automatic renewal provision of five (5) years to be exercised by the tenant 
1 The complete citation in the Record for the Affidavits of Glenn Knapp and Rachel Knapp is R., pp. 54-67 and 68-
78, respectively. 
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after the expiration of the original term; and C) the option to buy a permanent easement with 
to service billboard sign for a lump sum $10,000 thus 
yearly contractual payment. and On 
Knapps executed the Sign Lease and Mr. Knapp executed the Sign Lease before a notary public 
the following day. See id., pp. 58-61 and 72.2 
Shortly after the Knapps executed the Sign Lease, Tiller White's representative, Dr. 
Daniel Tiller, discussed and reviewed the terms of the lease with Mr. Knapp. See, R., p. 85.3 
After the Sign Lease was executed, it was assigned to Canyon Outdoor. See, R., p. 35. 
In April of 2003, Curtis Massood of Canyon Outdoor met and introduced himself to the 
Knapps. See id. Mr. Massood, again, met with the Knapps in May of2003 where they discussed 
the acquisition of an easement for a lump sum per the terms of the Sign Lease. See, R., pp. 36, 
55, and 69. The parties agreed to a lump sum payment of $12,000 and executed a Perpetual 
Easement Agreement. See id. Canyon Outdoor inadvertently failed to record the Perpetual 
Easement Agreement. 
Before purchasing the easement, the Knapps and Canyon Outdoor originally 
contemplated locating the billboard sign between the Knapps then existing building and Tiller 
White's building. See, R., pp. 37 and 56. Tiller White objected to this original location and 
demanded the billboard sign be relocated to the other side of the Knapps' then existing building. 
See id. See also, R., p. 84.4 Canyon Outdoor complied with Tiller White's objection and 
relocated the billboard sign to the other side of the Knapps' then existing building. 
2 The Sign Lease executed by the Knapps are reflected on Exhibits A and B attached to the Affidavit of Glenn 
Knapp and Exhibit A attached to the Affidavit of Rachel Knapp. 
3 The specific reference in the Record and to Exhibit A attached to the Affidavit of Ed Guerricabeitia in Support of 
the Motion for Summary Judgment are p. 14, LI. 14-25, p. 15, LI. 24-25, p. 16, LI. l-23. p. 14, LI. 14-25, p. 15, L. 
25, p. 16, LI. 1-23. 
4 The specific reference to Exhibit A attached to the Affidavit of Ed Guerricabeitia in Support of the Motion for 
Summary Judgment is p. 13, LI. 1-17. 
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Shortly after acquiring the easement, Canyon Outdoor commenced construction of the 
R., 40 m in width thus 
putting any subsequent on on the 
property. See id The construction and erection of the billboard sign was completed in May of 
2003. See id 
The construction of a billboard sign of this size required digging out a footing of a 
minimum of four (4) feet in diameter and 20 feet in depth. See id The billboard sign consists of 
a pole and head which are constructed on the ground during the digging process. See id A 
crane is used to lift and install the pole and head into the footing. See id Afterwards, 
approximately ten (10) yards of concrete is poured into the footing to secure and stabilize the 
pole. See id Electricity is then brought to the pole to illuminate the lights facing the advertising 
sign. See id. The overall hard cost to construct and erect the pole is generally between $40,000 
to $50,000 depending on the conditions of the property. See id This cost does not include the 
soft costs of obtaining government approvals, building permits, purchasing an easement or other 
incidental costs associated with setting up the billboard sign to commence operations which costs 
vary in range depending on the particular state and county the sign is to be located. See id 
Once constructed and erected, the billboard sign can withstand 40 psf ("pounds per 
square foot") which is equivalent to 120 to 130 mile per hour wind gales. See id. 
Canyon Outdoor paid $10,000 for the assignment and rights to the Sign Lease from 
Lockeridge, $12,000 to the Knapps for the easement and $40,000 to construct and erect the 
billboard sign for a total cost of $62,000. See, R, p. 38. 
Upon the payment of the lump sum and construction of the billboard sign, the terms of 
the Perpetual Easement Agreement were fully performed. See, R., pp. 56 and 69. 
Prior to and after the erection of the billboard sign, Tiller White had approached the 
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Knapps on several occasions to determine their interest and desire to sell their property. See, R., 
p. 85.5 
In February of 2006, Tiller White approached the Knapps and offered to buy their 
property for $225,000. See, R., pp. 56 and 69-70. At the time, their property was not listed for 
sale. See id. Mr. Knapp told Dr. Tiller that he had received a lump sum payment of $12,000 
from Canyon Outdoor and that the agreement provided free advertising if one face was vacant 
and asked if that was a deal breaker. See, R., pp. 56 and 87-88.6 Dr. Tiller responded it was not 
a deal breaker. See, R., p. 56. The Knapps accepted the offer and they closed on the sale in early 
March of 2006. See, R., pp. 56, 69-70 and 87.7 
Prior to the closing, Tiller White had received and read the terms of the Sign Lease and 
knew Mr. Knapp received a lump sum payment. See, R., pp. 85-88.8 Despite knowing this 
information, Tiller White never contacted Canyon Outdoor to confirm the status of its interest in 
the subject property. See, R., p. 88.9 Dr. Tiller admitted that the only investigation and due 
diligence performed in determining whether any other interests existed on the subject property 
was reviewing the Sign Lease, discussions with Mr. Knapp, and obtaining a title policy which 
did not reflected a recorded easement. See id. 10 
Dr. Tiller acknowledged that by acquiring the property Tiller White was subject to and 
assumed the terms of the lease. See, R., p. 89. 11 
5 The specific reference to Exhibit A is p. 16, LI. 6-16. 
6 The specific reference to Exhibit A is p. 22, LI. 11-25, p. 23, II. 1-22, p. 29, LI. 9-13. 
7 The specific reference to Exhibit A is p. 25, L. 12. 
8 The specific reference to Exhibit A is p. 16, LI. 3-5, p. 21, LL 20-23, p. 22, LI. 23-25, p. 23, IL l-22, and p.29, LI. 
9-13. 
9 The specific reference to Exhibit A is p. 28, LI. 11-25. 
10 The specific reference to Exhibit A is p. 28, LI. 4-10. 
11 The specific reference to Exhibit A is p. 31, LI. 5-11. 
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In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the district court found the easement agreement 
the Knapps and Canyon Outdoor was unenforceable against Tiller White, holding 
recordation issue is dispositive." See, R., p. 13 L 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A) Whether the District Court erred in finding as a matter of law that Canyon 
Outdoor's easement was unenforceable against Tiller White pursuant to Idaho Code§ 55-815 
and that Tiller White was a bona fide purchaser under Idaho Code§§ 55-606 and 55-812. 
IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
In this case, the claim before the district court was a quiet title action and therefore, the 
parties stipulated to present the case by motion for summary judgment rendering the district 
court sitting as the trier of fact 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the district court set out the applicable standard 
of review explained in Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 93 P.3d 685 (2004) 
on cross-motions for summary judgment: 
On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court employs 
the same standard as used by the district court originally ruling on the motion. 
(Citation omitted). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter oflaw." LR.C.P. 56(c). The fact that both parties move for 
summary judgment does not in and of itself establish that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact. (Citations omitted). The fact that the parties have filed cross-
motions for summary judgment does not change the applicable standard of 
review, and this Court must evaluate each party's motion on its own merits. 
(Citation omitted) . 
. . . When an action will be tried before the court without a jury, the trial court as 
the trier of fact is entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the 
undisputed evidence properly before it and grant the summary judgment despite 
the possibility of conflicting inferences. (Citations omitted). The test for 
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reviewing the inferences drawn by the trial court is 
supports the inferences. (Citations omitted). 
at 1-62, 93 P.3d at 691-92. 
the record reasonably 
B. The District Court erred in finding as a matter of law that the Perpetual 
Easement Agreement was unenforceable against Tiller White under Idaho Code 
§ 55-815 and that Tiller White was protected as a bona fide purchaser under 
Idaho Code§§ 55-606 and 55-812. 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the district court held that the recordation of the 
easement agreement, or lack thereof in this case, was dispositive on the issue. The district 
court's rationale and reasoning in support of its holding was as follows: 
Plaintiff did not know about the unrecorded easement until 2013. Defendant 
argues that Plaintiffs knowledge of various facts put it on notice of the easement, 
such that "good faith" required a more thorough investigation. This Court 
disagrees. Glen Knapp only explicitly told Plaintiff about the lease, and the only 
document Plaintiff saw at the time of purchase was the lease agreement. Plaintiff 
has a title policy issued, which due to the non-recording did not disclose the 
easement. Similarly, the warranty deed had no restrictions and made no mention 
of the easement. 
Defendant's argument is that Plaintiff should have connected the dots regarding 
the lump sum payment and the possibility of having advertising space to arrive at 
the conclusion that Defendant might have an easement. However, this 
information did not make the easement an "open and obvious" inconsistent claim. 
(Footnote omitted). Under these facts, Plaintiff conducted a reasonable 
investigation of the premises and was under no duty to inquire further to discover 
Defendant's unrecorded easement. Plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser with 
respect to the easement. 
See, R., pp. 131-32. 
The district court's rationale and reasoning in finding Tiller White as a bona fide 
purchaser under Idaho Code§§ 55-606 and 55-812 is erroneous. The district court's reasoning 
omits arid neglects genuine and undisputed material facts in the record which refute and overturn 
its conclusion as a matter of law. 
Specifically, Idaho Code § 55-606 titled "Conclusiveness of conveyance - Bona fide 
purchasers" provides: 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 11 
grant or conveyance of an estate in real property is against the 
grantor, also against every one subsequently claiming under him, except a 
UJ.'-'J""""wi or encumbrancer, who in good faith, and for a valuable consideration, 
acquires a or lien by an instrument or valid judgment is first duly 
recorded. (Emphasis added). 
In addition, Idaho Code§ 55-812 titled "Unrecorded conveyance void against subsequent 
purchasers" reads: 
states: 
Every conveyance of real property other than a lease for a term not exceeding one 
(1) year, is void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the same 
property, or any part thereof, in good faith and for a valuable consideration, 
whose conveyance is first duly recorded. (Emphasis added). 
Notwithstanding the foregoing statutes, Idaho Code§ 55-815 applies in this case and 
Unrecorded instruments valid between parties - An unrecorded instrument is 
valid as between parties thereto and those who have notice thereof. (Emphasis 
added). 
Based on the foregoing statutes, the district court's holding that the recordation issue in 
this matter, alone, was dispositive is clearly erroneous as a matter of law as Idaho Code § 55-815 
provides that an unrecorded instrument can still be valid and enforceable against "those who 
have notice thereof' which would include purchasers reflected in Idaho Code §§ 55-606 and 55-
812. Under the undisputed facts set forth herein regarding Tiller White's knowledge of the Sign 
Lease, terms of the Sign Lease, the Knapps' receipt of a lump sum payment, knowledge of the 
substance of a provision contained in the easement, Tiller White conclusively had notice of 
Canyon Outdoor's unrecorded easement Thus, the unrecorded easement is enforceable against 
Tiller white as provided for in Idaho Code § 5 5-815. 
The district court also erred in finding that Canyon Outdoor' s easement was not 
enforceable against Tiller White because Tiller White was a "bona fide" purchaser of the 
Knapps' property. Under Idaho law, a bona fide purchaser is defined as a purchaser who 
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acquires property, in good faith, and for valuable consideration without notice of any adverse 
another. Imig v. McDonald, 77 Idaho 314, 318, l P.2d 852, 855 (1955). 
In light of the fact that an unrecorded instrument may still be valid and enforceable 
against purchasers who have notice of a potential interest held by another, the issue becomes 
what is and constitutes "notice." 
Under Idaho's Recording Act, notice can be either actual knowledge or constructive 
knowledge. Sun Valley Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Kelsey, 131 Idaho 657,661, 962 P.2d 1041, 1045 
(1998). Constructive knowledge is that knowledge a reasonably prudent purchaser would have 
obtained from a reasonable investigation. Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851, 858-59, 230 P.3d 743, 
750-51 (2009). 
In Kaupp v. City of Hailey, 110 Idaho 337, 715 P.2d 1007 (App.1986), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals further elaborated on what constituted constructive knowledge: 
Imputed or constructive knowledge is the law's substitute for actual knowledge. 
It is a legally postulated notice of facts not otherwise perceived or recognized. 
Such notice may arise from official records and other documents by which a 
person is legally bound, from communications to an agent or predecessor in 
interest, or from knowledge of certain facts which should impart notice of the 
ultimate fact in issue. . . In such situations, extemporaneous facts which are 
sufficient to lead a reasonably prudent person upon an inquiry of a possible 
conflicting interest, will be treated as providing constructive notice. (Citation 
omitted). . . When a property owner possesses knowledge of extemporaneous 
facts which would reasonably indicate the possibility of an adverse use on the 
property, the owner is required to investigate. (Citation omitted). 
Id., 110 Idaho at 340, 715 P.2d at 1010. (Emphasis added). 
Absent recordation or proof of actual knowledge, the issue becomes the meaning of the 
term "in good faith" as used in the statutes above to qualify a subsequent purchaser as a bona 
fide purchaser. "Good Faith means a party purchased the property without knowing of any 
adverse claims to the property." Sun Valley Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Kelsey, 131 Idaho at 661, 962 
P.2d at 1045. 
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In Langroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho 218, 178 (1974), the Idaho Supreme Court 
purpose of the recording act in a race-notice jurisdiction, like Idaho, is to 
allow recorded interests to be effective against unrecorded interests when the 
recorded interest is taken for a valuable consideration and in good faith, Le., 
without knowledge, either actual or constructive. (Citation omitted) ... One 
who purchases or encumbrances with notice of inconsistent claims does not 
take in good faith, and one who fails to investigate the open or obvious 
inconsistent claim cannot take in good faith. (Citation omitted). 
Id, 96 Idaho at 220, 526 P.2d at 180 . 
. . . To guide the factfinder ... , we must define the duty of investigation put upon 
the purchaser or encumbrancer. In Paurley v. Harris, 7 5 Idaho 112, 268 P .2d 3 51 
(1954), a case dealing with the rights of a grantee whose grantor had settled a 
boundary dispute by an unrecorded agreement and acquiescence in the new line, 
the Court said: 
"One buying property in the possession of a third party is put on notice of 
any claim of title or right of possession by such third party, which a 
reasonable investigation would reveal." (Citation omitted). 
We believe that this is the appropriate rule in determining good faith under the 
recording act, i.e., that one cannot be a good faith purchaser or encumbrancer 
when a reasonable investigation of the property would have revealed the existence 
of the conflicting claim in question. 
Id., 96 Idaho at 220-21, 526 P .2d at 180-81. 
See also, Farrell v. Brown, 111 Idaho 1027, 1033, 729 P.2d 1090, 1096 (App. 1986) 
("[W]hatever is notice enough to excite the attention of a man of ordinary prudence and prompt 
him to further inquiry, amounts to notice of all such facts as a reasonable investigation would 
disclose."). See also, Imig v. _McDonald, 77 Idaho 314, 318, 291 P 2d 852, 855 (1955) ("Further, 
one who purchases property with sufficient knowledge to put him, or a reasonably prudent 
person, on inquiry is not a bona fide purchaser."). 
When determining whether a party is a bona fide purcha-,er, the Court must look at what 
notice the party had before and up to the time the party recorded its interest. Sun Valley Hot 
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Springs Ranch v. Kelsey, supra. See also, Trunnel v. Ferge!, 153 Idaho 68, 72,278 P.3d 938, 
942 (2012) (A party must show that at the time of the purchase he paid a valuable consideration 
without notice, actual or constructive, any outstanding adverse rights another.). 
To determine whether Tiller White was a bona fide purchaser, the Court must look to the 
undisputed facts, information and documents Tiller White possessed and reviewed before and 
up to the time it purchased and recorded its interest. 
In 2003, Tiller White had actual knowledge that its predecessors in interest, Glenn and 
Rachel Knapp, entered into a lease with a billboard company for the construction and erection of 
a billboard advertising sign. At that time, Tiller White admitted to speaking with Glenn Knapp 
and had physically seen and reviewed the lease executed by the Knapps. See, R., p. 85. 12 
Further corroborating Tiller White had actual knowledge of a third party's interest in the 
property was the fact that Tiller White objected to the original location where the billboard sign 
was to be situated, so Canyon Outdoor relocated the billboard sign to the other side of the then 
existing building where the billboard sign stands to this day. 
In 2006, Tiller White offered to purchase the Knapps' property for $225,000 which was 
accepted. Prior to closing and recording its deed, Tiller White received, read and thoroughly 
reviewed the terms of the sign lease. See, R., p. 88. 13 In addition to reviewing the sign lease, Dr. 
Tiller had discussions with Mr. Knapp regarding the terms and obligations of Canyon Outdoor 
and its billboard sign. In its discussions with Mr. Knapp, Tiller White admitted and 
acknowledged that Mr. Knapp represented that they had received a lump sum payment and that 
Tiller White would not be receiving any rental payments on the lease. See, R., p. 87-88. 14 Mr. 
Knapp further represented to Tiller White that if a face on the billboard sign was vacant that 
12 The specific reference to Exhibit A is p. 16, LI. 3-5 and LL 17-25. 
13 The specific reference to Exhibit A is p. 26, LI. 1-3. 
14 The specific reference to Exhibit A is p. 22, LI. 23-25, p. 23, IL l-22, p.29, LI. 9-13. 
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Tiller White could obtain free advertising on the sign. See, R., p. 87. 15 
Tiller White acknowledged and admitted that when it acquired the Knapps' property, it 
knew it acquired the property subject to the terms of the lease. R., p. 89. 16 
A material term of the Sign Lease provided that the Lessor (the Knapps) could sell a 
permanent easement to the Lessee (Canyon Outdoor). Specifically, it stated: 
Lessor reserves the right to, at any time throughout the term of the lease, to sell 
Lessee a permanent easement with ingress and egress rights to service structure 
for a one time lump sum of $10,000 thus voiding the yearly contractual payment 
aforementioned. (Emphasis added). 
See R., pp. 43, 58-59 and 72. 
The provision abovementioned is the only provision in the lease which referenced a 
"lump sum" payment and the purchasing of an "easement." No other provisions in the lease 
utilized those specific and unique terms. See id 
Furthermore, Mr. Knapp's representation that Tiller White could possibly receive free 
advertising was not a term in the lease, but, in fact, was a term provided in the Addendum of the 
Perpetual Easement Agreement executed by the Knapps and Canyon Outdoor. See id See also, 
R., pp. 49, 65 and 76. 
Thus, Tiller White's knowledge of the terms of the Sign Lease, the payment of the lump 
sum which could only relate to the purchase of an easement under the Sign Lease, that no 
payment of rent for the sign would be made and its knowledge of a term only contained in the 
Addendum to the Perpetual Easement Agreement conclusively establishes that Tiller White had 
actual notice of the easement and is enforceable against Tiller White under Idaho Code 5 5-815. 
At a minimum, Tiller white had constructive notice of the easement and Tiller white could not be 
entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser. Dr. Tiller considered himself a sophisticated and 
15 The specific reference to Exhibit A is p. 25, LI. 17-23. 
16 The specific reference to Exhibit A is p. 31, LL 8-11. 
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informed buyer of real estate. See, R., p. 83. 17 Despite his sophistication and experience in 
estate and his admission of reviewing the Sign Lease, and more particularly the 
providing for the sale of an easement for a lump sum, before the property, 
Tiller White never made any attempt to contact Canyon Outdoor to confirm whether or not it 
may or possibly had an easement interest in the subject property. 
The district court stated that Tiller White had no duty and could not "have connected the 
dots regarding the lump sum payment and the possibility of having advertising space to arrive at 
the conclusion that (Canyon Outdoor] might have an easement." However, the district court's 
statement ignores the material and undisputed facts including that Tiller White reviewed the 
lease and read the provision which authorized the sale of an easement for a lump sum payment 
before it closed and recorded its deed. 
Instead, Tiller White stated that the only investigation it conducted was having a title 
policy issued, discussions with Mr. Knapp and reviewed the Sign Lease. See, R., p. 88. 18 
Contrary to the district court's conclusion, Tiller White received and reviewed a 
document that contained a provision for the option to sell an easement on a lump sum payment 
voiding the annual rental payments. In addition, it had communications with its predecessor in 
interest acknowledging receipt of a lump sum payment and who represented terms that were not 
incorporated in the lease it reviewed, but only included within the easement agreement. Tiller 
White possessed sufficient knowledge of certain facts that disclosed knowledge of the ultimate 
fact at issue; i.e. whether Canyon Outdoor possessed an easement on the property, BEFORE it 
purchased and recorded its deed. 
As expressed by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Wood v. Simonson, 108 Idaho 699, 703-
17 The specific reference to Exhibit A is p. 9, LL 7-9. 
18 The specific reference to Exhibit A is p. 28, LL 4-25 and p. 29, LL 1-8. 
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P.2d 319, 323-24 (App.1985): 
facts appear which would cast suspicion the vendor the 
the reasonably prudent person, the purchaser "does not discharge his duty 
investigate] by making inquiry of his vendor alone, and hence the fact that the 
purchaser is misled by the vendor's false statements is usually not sufficient to 
protect him. (Citations omitted). 
Accordingly, Tiller White possessed constructive knowledge of sufficient facts which 
reasonably indicated the possibility of an adverse claim on the property held by Canyon Outdoor 
which by law imposed a duty and required Tiller White to conduct a reasonable and prudent 
investigation to ascertain the potential status of any adverse claim. See Kaupp v. City of Hailey, 
supra. Tiller White did not perform a reasonable and prudent investigation under the undisputed 
facts in the record. 
The evidence and record reflects the billboard sign stands 40 feet in height and 30 feet in 
width and is constructed into the ground and is not easily removable or detachable from the 
property. The billboard sign was an obvious structure that would put any prospective buyer on 
notice that a third party may have an interest in the property. 
According to the Langroise Court, Idaho law requires any prospective buyer with actual 
or constructive notice of a potential adverse claim to conduct a reasonable investigation to 
determine the status of the potential claim. In light of the fact that Tiller White read the Sign 
Lease including the option to sell an easement, knew the Knapps received a lump sum payment 
which term was only provided in one provision in the lease, and provided terms that were outside 
the lease, Tiller White had a duty and obligation to conduct further inquiry about the potential 
interest of Canyon Outdoor. 
Here, Tiller White had constructive notice of a potential adverse claim which imposed 
upon it a duty to contact and communicate with Canyon Outdoor to determine whether Canyon 
Outdoor possessed an interest on the property before Tiller White purchased, closed and 
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recorded its deed to the property. This was a common and regular practice by prospective buyers 
of property which possessed a Canyon Outdoor billboard sign situated on it. See R., pp. 38-40. 
Tiller White knew who the billboard company was back in 2003 p. 84. 19 Prior to 
acquiring the property, a reasonable and prudent buyer would have contacted Canyon Outdoor to 
confirm its interest in the subject property in light of the fact that the lease provided the 
opportunity for the landlord to convey a permanent easement to Canyon Outdoor with a lump 
sum payment. 
The Langroise Court held that the meaning of good faith in the Idaho Recording statutes 
required a reasonable investigation of open and obvious inconsistent claims and the failure to 
conduct this investigation was not good faith and would not render the buyer a bona fide 
purchaser of the property. 
Tiller White was on constructive notice of the billboard sign and the potential of a 
permanent easement with a lump sum payment through the lease. Tiller White possessed this 
information before it purchased the property which information would have led a reasonable and 
prudent buyer to inquiry and investigate further. 
Even though the Perpetual Easement Agreement was not recorded, Tiller White still had 
the duty and obligation to conduct a reasonable investigation of Canyon Outdoor's property 
interest under Idaho law in order to be considered a bona fide purchaser. Tiller White failed to 
perform a reasonable investigation that a reasonable and prudent buyer would have performed 
under the facts and circumstances that it possessed before the recording of its interest. 
i~~ccordingly, Tiller \Vhite cannot and should not be considered a bona fide purchaser 
under Idaho Code§ 55-606 or Idaho Code§ 55-812 and that Canyon Outdoor's easement has 
priority and should prevail pursuant to Idaho Code§ 55-815. 
19 The specific reference to Exhibit A is p. 13, LI. 5-17. 
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V. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
lS and reasonable costs 
on appeal pursuant to LA.R. 40 and 4L 
Attorney fees are awardable only where they are authorized by statute or contract Heller 
v. Cenarussa, 106 Idaho 571,682 P.2d 524 (1984). 
Idaho Code § 12-121 provides, in part: "[I]n any civil action, the judge may award 
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties, ... " The Idaho Supreme Court has 
held that an award of attorney fees on appeal will only be awarded when the Court is left with 
the abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or 
without foundation. Idaho Military Historical Society, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 329 P .2d 
1072 (2014). 
Based on the undisputed evidence in the record and the Respondent's admissions of the 
facts and circumstances known to it before purchasing the property, any argument it may raise in 
opposition in an attempt to refute that it possessed constructive notice and had no duty to 
investigation the status of Appellant's interest in the property would be a frivolous and 
unreasonable defense in this appeal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Based on the undisputed evidence in the record, the foregoing case law, statutory 
authority and arguments above, Canyon Outdoor respectfully requests this Court enter its Order 
reversing the district court's ruling that Tiller White was a bona fide purchaser under the statutes 
and in favor of Canyon Outdoor possessing a..11 enforceable easement having priority and 
prevailing over Tiller White's interest under Idaho Code§ 55-815. 
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DATED this 1 day of December, 15. 
By: 
COPPLE & COPPLE 
ED GUERRICABEITIA, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant/ Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 17th day of December, 2015, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was served upon the following: 
Edwin G. Schiller 
Schiller & Schiller 
P.O. Box 21 
Nampa, Idaho 83653-0021 
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a./" U.S. MAIL 
Hand Delivery 
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Facsimile Transmission: 466-7910 
Email 
~~= 
Ed Guerricabeitia 
